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The Israeli occupation of Palestine and its impact on the proliferation and longevity of
transnational Salafi jihad is largely underestimated in current literature. In this thesis, I argue that
Palestine, defined as both the nation and physical borders before the Balfour Declaration, largely
contributed to the twentieth century revival of transnational Salafi jihad and is used by both Al
Qaeda and ISIS as liberation and annihilation movements, respectively. In order to assess the
motivational and organizational influences of the Israeli occupation of Palestine on transnational
Salafi jihad, I examine the works of Abdullah Azzam, a selection of Osama Bin Laden’s fatwas,
and open source recruitment propaganda from Al Qaeda and ISIS. In considering this selection
of primary source material, I found that Israel’s occupation of Palestine and the conflict in
general has made substantial motivational and organizational contributions to both the
proliferation and longevity of transnational Salafi jihadi movements and, in this case, Al Qaeda
and ISIS and each organization’s respective grand strategies.
iii
“Our slogan is: ‘Here we start, and in Jerusalem we meet.”
-Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Inspire Magazine, Issue 2 (Fall 2010)
iv
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Section 1.1: Research Question
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a relatively localized phenomenon in regard to the
concept of physical borders in Israel and Palestine, however the sustained political, social, and
regional security implications of the conflict have transformed the modern Middle East. Israel’s
occupation of Palestine has divided nations, complicated regional security and diplomatic
cooperation, contributed to the deepening polarity of American politics, increased anti-Semitic
and anti-Zionist sentiments on a global level, and inspired both local and international nationalist
liberation movements. Notably, the case of Palestine,1 after the creation of the Israeli state in
1948 and the Six Day War of 1967, contributed to the revival of militant Islamic jihad in the
twentieth century.2 While current scholarship on Salafi jihadism attributes the rise of militant
Salafi jihad to markers such as the entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood onto the world stage,
legacies of Western colonialism, the Soviet-Afghan War, 9/11, or the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I
argue that the revival of Salafi jihadism and its evolution into a transnational movement can be
directly traced back to a relatively local and ongoing phenomenon: the Israeli occupation of
Palestine. While the above factors contributed to the twentieth century revival of Salafi jihad, the
cultural and religious significance of Jerusalem and the proliferation of an Israeli state in
Palestine and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of Palestinians are significantly overlooked factors
in current Salafi jihadi literature.
In order to understand the foundations of modern transnational Salafi jihadi movements
and how Palestine has come to be utilized as both an annihilation and liberation movement by
2 Thomas Hegghammer, "The rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalization of Jihad," International
Security 35, no. 3 (2010): 53-94.
1 Palestine is definitive of both the nation and physical borders of Palestinian land before the creation of the Israeli
state.
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said groups, a brief history of contemporary Islamist phenomenons and ideological contributions
to the movement must be considered.
Hassan Al Banna, the late founder and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (concieved in
Egypt in 1928) was only active on social and political levels in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Jordan,
Palestine, Algeria, and Sudan3 until Israel came into being, which in turn gave incentive for the
group to engage in jihad against the Israelis and colonial powers in the region.4 The Muslim
Brotherhood made monumental contributions to the rise of modern Salafi jihadism in the
twentieth century and played a large role in actually acting on the militant jihad ideas of Ibn
Taymiyyah and Sayyd Qutb,5 particularly regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s
recruitment of over 10,000 Palestinian mujahid to fight for Palestine and the rights of its citizens
following the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine in in 1947.6 Al Banna himself wanted to
equip over 70,000 mujahid to defend Palestine.7 In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
supported Palestinians against the British during the Arab Revolt in the mid-1930s, established
the General Central Committee for Palestine’s Aid, and ran a Palestine campaign that attracted
thousands of new members and resulted in a number of new branches- including branches with
military wings.8 Within the next decade, the Muslim Brotherhood effectively mobilized in terms
of political jihad and organized a series of widspread, pro-Palestine protests in Egypt that turned
violent with police intervention.9 However, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a violent organization
9 Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers," 367-369.
8 Israel Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39," Middle Eastern Studies 22, no.
3 (1986): 367-97.
7 Ibid, 61-62.
6 Helbawy, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,” 61-62.
5 John M. Calvert, “The Striving Shaykh: Abdullah Azzam and the Revival of Jihad,” Journal of Religion and
Society 2 (2007).
4 Richard H. Shultz, Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement, USAF Institute for National
Security Studies 66, 2008.
3 Kamal Helbawy, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects,” in Political
Islam: Context versus Ideology, ed. Khaled Hroub (SOAS, 2010).
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by nature, as it was founded on the ideals of using political and social jihad to usher in a return of
the Islamic Golden Age.10 At the same time, many of its offshoots, namely Hamas and Hasm,
have military wings or function as predominantly militant organizations.11 Strikingly, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s militant offshoots were directly inspired by the MB’s pro-Palestine campaign
during the 1930s.12 Therefore, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as a transnational political
force has contributed to the revival of transnational Salafi jihad by means of Palestine and its
militant factions that formed in response to its Palestine campaign. Hence, the Muslim
Brotherhood, while politically and socially nonviolent, created a vacuum for Salafi jihadists
particularly inspired by Palestine.
Similarly, the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s contributed to the rise of transnational
Salafi jihad, but it was not simply the mobilization of the Afghan and Arab mujahideen that
caused Salafi jihad to go international. Rather, it was one of the first legitimate opportunities for
emerging leaders of the Salafi jihadi movement to successfully infiltrate with their ideas and,
consequently, carry out violent jihad. Abdullah Azzam, the leader of the mujahideen in
Afghanistan, preached that the Soviet-Afghan war was a step towards eventually returning to
Palestine and liberating it from the Zionists through violent jihad.13 Hence, it was never truly
about Afghanistan to begin with. Instead, the Soviet-Afghan War was, at its core, part of a
broader Salafi jihadi strategy to liberate Palestine.14
14 Azzam, Al-Dfaa a’n Iradi al-Muslimeen.
13 Abdullah Azzam, Al-Dfaa a’n Iradi al-Muslimeen: Aham Furood al-Ayen [The Defense of Muslim Lands: The
Most Important of Individual Duties], Moussassa li-daam al-jihad wa al-mujahideen.
http://www.almeshkat.net/books/archive/books/674_674.pdf.
12 Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers,” 367-370.
11 Rep. Muslim Brotherhood. Counter Extremism Project, n.d.
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/muslim-brotherhood.
Khaled Hroub, “Hamas’s Ideology, Strategy, and Objectives,” in Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, 15-33. London; New
York: Pluto Press, 2010.
10 Ibid, 369.
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In regard to 9/11 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, these instances- while inflammatory-
did not mark the beginning of modern, transnationalized Salafi jihad. As argued in Global
Salafism, all conditions for confessional violence in Iraq were met after the U.S. invasion, as
radicalized Sunnis believed Islam was in danger.15 Abu Musab Al Zarqawi (the soon-to-be
founder and leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) originally used the U.S. invasion to pit
Sunnis against Shias before shifting focus to Americans.16 While seemingly unconnected to
Palestine and the Israeli occupation, 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq were actually
byproducts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as will be explored in chapter three. Therefore, I
seek to answer the following research question: “How has Israeli’s occupation of Palestine
contributed to the rise of the modern, transnational Salafi jihadi movement and how does the
occupation fuel international Salafi jihadi organizations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, today?”
The narrative of the influence and magnitude of Palestine in transnational jihad can be
traced back, in part, to Abdullah Azzam- popularly coined as the “Spiritual Father of Global
Jihad.”17 Azzam, a native of Silat al-Harithiya (a small village near Jenin in the West Bank), was
deeply affected by the Israeli occupation of his homeland in 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967.18
He would later become the leader of the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan
War in the 1980s, an internationally acclaimed freedom fighter, U.S.-lauded and sponsored war
hero, and spiritual father to Hamas, Al Qaeda, and the modern, transnational Salafi Jihadi
movement. According to Azzam, Palestine was at the heart of the jihad’s broader strategy to
create a unified, Islamic state by liberating Muslim lands from the kuffar19 and returning to the
19 Non-believers, non-Muslims.
18 Thomas Hegghammer, “Palestinian,” in The Caravan: Abdullah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad (Cambridge
University Press, 2020): 11-27.
17 Thomas Hegghammer, “Icon,” in The Caravan: Abdullah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad (Cambridge
University Press, 2020): 463-492.
16 Steinberg, “Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi’is,” 107-108.
15 Guido Steinberg, “Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi’is: Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-Shi’ism,” in Global
Salafism, ed. Roel Meijer (Oxford University Press, 2009): 107-125.
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“Golden Age of Islam-” as he believed modern Muslims and the West were in a state of jahiliyya
and needed to be liberated from secularism and the immorality of modern generations.20
Therefore, the jihad in Afghanistan was not an arbitrary war- it was the beginning of a
larger movement with Palestine at the center. Azzam considered it a necessary step towards his
vision of the imminent restoration of Jerusalem to Islamic and, consequently, Palestinian rule.21
Today, Azzam’s sermons and books, such as The Defense of Muslim Lands and Join the
Caravan, continue to be extensively circulated within the Salafi Islamist dialogue.22 Namely, Al
Qaeda and ISIS, both of which capitalize on Azzam’s call to retake historically Muslim lands
through jihad as fard ‘ayn.23 Azzam also largely wrote Hamas’ original charter in 1988,
extensively fundraised for the organization throughout the Middle East and the United States,
and his teachings are a cornerstone of Hamas’ political and militant movements.24
In order to examine the “Palestine effect” on transnational jihad, I will examine both
direct and indirect organizational and historical influences of Palestine in the movement, and will
use Al Qaeda and ISIS as case studies. In regard to the direct influences of Palestine, I will
examine its impact on non-Palestinian Salafi jihadi groups’ recruitment ideologies and methods,
propaganda, literature, and organization. On the other hand, I will examine how Palestine
indirectly affects these groups in their accusations of the failures of modern Arab and Islamic
governments to confront the Israeli occupation and secure permanent Palestinian rights.
I selected Al Qaeda and ISIS in order to highlight the transnational aspect of the
“Palestine effect” on Salafi jihad, connections to Palestine via each organization’s founding
leaders and members, interpretations of the question of Palestine in recruitment propaganda and
24 Asaf Maliach, “Abdullah Azzam, Al-Qaeda, and Hamas,” Military and Strategic Affairs 2, no. 2 (2010)-1-15.
23 Individual obligation
22 Andrew McGregor, “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone:’ 'Abdullah 'Azzam and the Islamist Revolution," Journal of
Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (2003).
21 Azzam, Al-Dfaa a’n Iradi al-Muslimeen: Aham Furood al-Ayen.
20 Jed Lea-Henry, “The Life and Death of Abdullah Azzam,” Middle East Policy 25, no.1 (2018): 1-16.
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mythology, variations in regional aspirations, organizational size and scope, longevity and
modernity, and end goals. In addition, the founding leaders of these organizations, respectively
Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, were deeply connected to Palestine both by blood
and ideology- bin Laden was Saudi but developed his ideology based on his relationship with
Azzam (Palestinian) and his fixation on Palestine. Zarqawi, Jordanian-Palestinian, was the
mentee of Ideologue Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (also born in the West Bank) and his ideology-
while deviating from that of his mentor- was also driven by Palestine. Further, both organizations
emerged in tandem with and in the wake of regional geopolitical turning points. Al Qaeda, borne
out of the Soviet-Afghan War, inspired the emergence of Palestine-based Salafi jihadi
organizations, which grew up during the First Intifada 1987-1993. While Al Qaeda did not
become a global phenomenon until 9/11, its attack on the World Trade Center was directly
connected to Bin Laden’s resentment towards the U.S. for propping up Israel- thus inherently
connected to the Israeli occupation in Palestine. In Bin Laden’s own words, “an attack on the
United States is an attack on Israel.”
ISIS, on the other hand, emerged from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and fought with Iraqi
insurgencies during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. At the time, AQI was focused on the
annihilation of Shi’ites under the leadership of Zarqawi.25 However, its priorities have since
shifted towards a greater focus on Palestine and using Judaism, the United States, and Israel as a
means for annihilation of all unbelievers.
Regarding Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s inherited organization was essentially a direct
byproduct of the work of Abdullah Azzam. While Azzam’s jihad in Afghanistan was in
preparation for a larger war against the state of Israel that drew in Arab mujahideen from across
25 Steinberg, “Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi’is,” 107-112.
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the region, Palestine was nevertheless always at the heart of the war against Soviet invaders.26 In
a sense, Azzam’s leadership drew attention to the spiritual significance of reconquering Muslim
lands in an effort to retake Palestine, therefore “transnationalizing” ideas of waging jihad for the
sake of Palestine. Since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, Al Qaeda has managed to
expand beyond Afghanistan and take root on a transnational level (e.g. Iraq, Pakistan, Syria,
AQAP in Yemen, and Al Shabaab in Somalia). This is a reflection of Azzam’s call to wage jihad
wherever there is an opportunity- in efforts to eventually return to Palestine and wage jihad
there.27 Azzam’s ideas were highly appealing and, considering recent events in Israel-Palestine,
easily took root and led to a new generation of Salafi jihadis with Palestine in mind.
Therefore, the international size and scope of Al Qaeda speaks to the global significance
of Jerusalem, which is widely present in the organization’s social media, recruitment methods,
and overarching strategies. By examining the recruitment materials, methods, organization, size,
scope, history, and ultimate strategy of Al Qaeda, I aim to highlight the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict’s longstanding role, nonnegotiability, and permanent presence in the heart of the
organization.
ISIS, on the other hand, is the more complex case study, as its founder, Abu Musaab
al-Zarqawi (Palestinian-Jordanian), was deeply focused on the annhilation of the Shiites and
purging Islam of its internal impurities (e.g. the Shiites, Yazidis, Christians).28 At the same time,
Zarqawi had intentions in Palestine and a goal, inherited from Al Qaeda, to form an Islamic
caliphate around Israel in order to eventually establish and create a unified, Islamic state.29
29 Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning,” The New
Yorker, September 4, 2006. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan.
28 Steinberg, “Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi ‘is,” 107-125.
27 Abdullah Azzam, The Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important of Individual Duties. C.a. 1987.
https://english.religion.info/2002/02/01/document-defence-of-the-muslim-lands/.
26 Azzam, Al-Dfaa a’n Iradi al-Muslimeen.
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Further, the usage of Palestine and anti-Zionist sentiments in ISIS’ recruitment videos,
newsletters, and propaganda suggest a potential shift in focus from ethnic and religious
minorities in Iraq. In light of Zarqawi’s assassination in 2006, I will look at how the organization
has potentially shifted focus from the Shiites to Palestine, its broad strategy of establishing an
Islamic caliphate that includes Palestine. I will go on to analyze ISIS’ usage of Palestine in
recruitment literature and propaganda, as well as the prevalence of Palestine in ISIS’s broad
strategy, regional and international aspirations, and how it connects to ISIS’s past strategy in
northern Iraq and Syria.
While Azzam is, no doubt, one of the most influential figures in the birth of Hamas, I am
excluding Hamas from my case studies of Al Qaeda and ISIS for several reasons. First, militant
jihad is only one wing and function of Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas, an offshoot of
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, was founded on the notion of waging militant jihad against
the Israeli state in the wake of the First Intifada.30 Further, Hamas’ original charter of 1988 states
that “it is compulsory that the banner of jihad be raised… to instill the spirit of jihad in the heart
of the nation so that they would confront the enemies.”31 Considering the charter’s full context
and the fact that Azzam inspired the breadth of it, “jihad” is likely definitive of militant jihad-
delineating to the engagement in acts of war against the Israeli occupation. While the ideals of
waging jihad are still relevant in Hamas’ militant wing, the organization has since evolved into
an entity that has won seats in Palestinian elections and acts as the ruling party on the Gaza
Strip.32 Hence, Hamas’ interpretation of jihad and its regional goals have evolved to those of
more accessible and realistic goals, and its success as a political organization has thereby
32 Hroub, “Hamas’s Ideology, Strategy, and Objectives,” 15-33.
31 “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” Lillian Goldman Law Library,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
30 Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (1993):
5-19.
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distanced itself from the core functions, objectives, and transnationality of prominent Salafi
jihadist organizations (e.g. Al Qaeda and ISIS)- also inspired by Palestine and the teachings of
Azzam.
As will be demonstrated in chapter three, Al Qaeda and ISIS each have an overarching
strategy to create an Islamic caliphate around Palestinian land. Hamas currently only conducts
local operations- mostly political- and focuses on liberating Palestinians through political
representation and actively refusing a two-state solution, rather than solely waging militant
jihad.33 Furthermore, Al Qaeda and ISIS have condemned Hamas for its complacency, failure to
actually wage jihad against the Israelis.34 Azzam also criticized the movement and eventually
disassociated from it, although he was a prominent supporter of its founder, Ahmad Yassin, and
wrote a book praising Hamas (Hamas: The Historical Roots and Charters) shortly after its
conception.35
Section 1.2: Historical Background
In order to understand the significance of the “Palestine effect”36 on modern,
transnational Salafi jihad, an overview of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
neccesary. The emergence of the Israeli state in Palestine has acted as a catalyst (if not the root of
the issue, as will be discussed later) in the Salafi jihadi narrative. However, current scholarship
either passes off the conflict as insignificant or merely a coincidence in discussions about the
revival of Salafi jihad in the twentieth century.37 I argue the opposite: it was the entry of Israel
onto the world stage and the subsequent wars, nakba, and humiliation of Arab nations that both
37 John A. Turner, Religious Ideology and the Roots of Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
36 Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers, “The Palestine Effect: The Role of Palestinians in the Transnational
Jihad Movement,” Die Welt des Islams 53, no. 3/4 (2013): 281-314.
35 Lea-Henry, “The Life and Death of Abdullah Azzam.”
34 Barak Mendelsohn, "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem," Survival 51, no. 4 (2009): 71-86.
33 Ibid.
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birthed and catalyzed the resurgence of Salafi jihad and the decades of transnational militantism
and terror to follow.
Nearing the end of World War Ⅰ and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine fell under
the British mandate, which included the Balfour Declaration of 1917, a statement expressing
support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.38 From 1922-1947, Palestine
witnessed its first wave of jihad, as anti-Zionist, Arab nationalist groups formed to counter both
British rule and rumours of the establishment of a Jewish state in their homeland.39 Jews, fleeing
persecution in Europe, immigrated to Palestine in masses, leading to the Arab uprising of 1937
and prolonged violence with Jewish settlers.40 Domestic violence was further exacerbated by the
United Nations’ vote to divide Palestine into an Israeli and Arab state in November of 1947,
leading to a mass exodus of Palestinians fleeing Zionist violence to Syria, Egypt, the West Bank,
Gaza, Lebanon, and Jordan- coinciding with the militant involvement of neighboring Arab
states.41 By the end of 1947, over 75,000 Palestinians had been forced from their homes or
voluntarily left (according to Israeli sources) and became indefinitely displaced both internally
and externally.42
Conflict between Zionists and Arabs continued through May 14, 1948, when Jewish
settlers formed a provisional national council and declared the state of Israel, leading to a
regional war including Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan.43 The conflict between Zionists
and Palestinians, once localized, became regional. Israelis celebrate their independence on this
43 Tessler, “Emergence and History of the Conflict.”
42 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld, 2006.
41 “Arab-Israeli wars.” Britannica Encyclopedia. https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars
Mark Tessler, “The Palestinian Disaster and Basic Issues after 1948,” in A History of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, Second Edition (Indiana University Press, 2009): 273-335.
40 Mark Tessler, “Emergence and History of the Conflict to 1948,” in A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
Second Edition, (Indiana University Press, 2009): 123-185.
39 Tom Bowden, "The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936-39," Middle Eastern Studies 11, no. 2 (1975):
147-74.
38 “History of the Question of Palestine,” United Nations, https://www.un.org/unispal/history/.
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day, while Palestinians remember the same day as al-nakba, the catastrophe. After months of
intercommunal war in the wake of Israel declaring independence, separate armistice negotiations
between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon began in January 1949.44 However, the
Palestinian struggle for independence was far from over. Essentially the events of 1947-48  mark
a turning point for both Israelis and Palestinians- Israel became independent, while Palestinians
were forcefully and indefinitely expelled from their land.45 The implications of these events still
echo in international politics in addition to inciting Salafi jihadi movements at the international
level.
In 1956, Israel would face another challenge from its Arab neighbor, Egypt. Known as
the Suez Crisis, Egypt’s nationalist and anti-Zionist president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized
the Suez Canal in July 1956 and triggered another crisis between Egypt and Israel.46 Two years
prior, Nasser’s military had been engaging in sporadic fighting with the Israelis at the border.47
Nasser, with the backing of the Soviets, nationalized the Suez Canal, leading to a
British-French-Israeli alliance that attempted to retake the canal via invasion.48 In reality, the
Israelis were offered little and belated assistance by their European allies, which caused the UN
to condemn Israel’s invasion, call for a ceasefire, and vote to create a peacekeeping force.49 The
Suez Crisis once again exacerbated Arab resentment towards the state of Israel, as it became seen
as a larger regional security threat that had the military power and international backing to
potentially overtake Arab forces.
49 “The Suez Crisis, 1956.” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez.
48 “Israel invades Egypt; Suez crisis begins.”
47 History.com editors, “Israel invades Egypt; Suez crisis begins,” History.com, October 29, 2009.
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-invades-egypt-suez-crisis-begins.
46 Derek Varble, The Suez Crisis, The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008.
45 Tessler, “The Palestinian Disaster.”
44 Kirsten E. Schulze, “The 1948 war: The battle over history,” The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict (2013): 45.
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In 1967, Arab forces confronted Israel again. In the years leading up to the Six Day War,
Israel experienced in influx of attacks by Palestinian guerilla groups from Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria.50 These attacks, some of the first instances of modern Salafi jihad in action,51 were
performed by groups such as the fedayeen52 in Jordan, of which Azzam was a member and
gained his first taste of militant jihad after fleeing Silat al-Harithiya. The fedayeen in Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon would eventually come under the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
which was fabricated at the Arab League Summit of 1964 in Cairo.53 At Nasser’s summit, the
leaders of Arab nations met together while Nasser successfully paved the way to see into fruition
his goals to divert the Jordan Valley’s resources, create the United Arab Command to prepare for
an offensive military campaign, establish the PLO, and start the process of standardizing Arab
arms and sending military aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.54 In late 1966, political tensions
escalated between Israel and the Arab states when Syria attempted to divert the Jordan river to
prevent Israel from cultivating the DZs, leading to a short battle between Syria and Israel.55
Continued Israeli border disputes and the increased activity of the PLO continued to deepen
regional political tensions, and the Arab states prepared for confrontation with Israel.56 By May
1967, Nasser had mobilized his military in the Sinai, closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli
shipping, and demanded the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the
Sinai.57 On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt, along with




55 Oren, “Arabs, Israelis, and the Great Powers.”
54 Michael B. Oren, “Arabs, Israelis, and the Great Powers,” in Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the
Modern Middle East. Presidio Press, 2017.
53 “PLO,” History.com, May 7, 2018. https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/plo.
52 Arab guerilla forces
51 Shultz, Global Insurgency Strategy.
50 “Six-Day War,” Britannica Encyclopedia, https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War.
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Aware of the mobilization of Arab states to confront Israel, the Israelis prepared for
imminent war and planned a preemptive strike. On June 5, 1967, Israel launched Operation
Focus, an aerial attack on Egypt, catching Nasser’s forces off guard.59 On the same day, Israel
gained air superiority and proceeded to invade Gaza and the Sinai, coinciding with the opening
of a second front in Jerusalem in wake of a Jordanian attack.60 By June 7, the Old City was
captured, embarrassing the Arab alliance. The final phase of the war along the northern
Israeli-Syrian border ended in the Israeli’s successful capture of the Golan.61 On June 10, the
United Nations declared a ceasefire, signaling the end of a miraculous victory for the Israelis, on
one hand. On the other hand, the Arab states were left humiliated and to deal with the severe
casualties and economic consequences of the war. Though only six days, the war sent
shockwaves throughout the region and indefinitely changed the social, political, and security
landscape of the Middle East. For decades to come, the world would watch the evolution of
Salafi jihadists from freedom fighters to terrorists. Roughly twelve years after Israel won the Six
Day War, Palestinians would flock to Afghanistan to wage jihad against the infidels, learn from
the internationally-lauded freedom fighter and mujahideen leader, Abdullah Azzam, and prepare
to liberate Palestine through militant jihad.
In the meantime, Syria and Egypt launched another offensive on Israel in 1973, known as
the Yom Kippur War. The war, which lasted only three weeks, was another attempt by the Arab
states to regain territory lost during the Six Day War. With support from Iraq and Jordan, Syria
and Egypt attacked Israeli forces in the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula on Yom Kippur (Day
of Atonement) on October 6, 1973.62 With U.S. support, the Israelis secured another military






victory and the UN declared a ceasefire on October 22.63 In 1974, Egypt and Israel signed
disengagement agreements and Israel conceded parts of the Sinai. In 1979, Israel signed the first
peace treaty with an Arab state, Egypt, then ruled by Sadat who was eager to strengthen ties to
Washington in order to boost Egypt’s failing economy.64 Syria, on the other hand, was left
devastated from war as it lost more of the Golan Heights to Israel, which in turn led to Syria and
the other Arab states voting to expel Egypt from the Arab League.65
In 1982, Israel formally withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula, while simultaneously facing
increased threats from the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon at home.66 As a result,
the Israeli Defense Forces proceeded to invade southern Lebanon and siege Beirut for two
months in efforts to drive out the PLO.67 Israel’s invasion devastated Palestinians that had fled to
southern Lebanon in the wake of 1948 and 1967. Three months after the invasion, Israel’s
Christian, Lebanese paramilitary ally murdered thousands of displaced Palestinians in Lebanon’s
Shatila refugee camp.68 Israel, along with their allied paramilitary force, known as the
Phalangists, ignored the UN’s ceasefire agreements and the US-brokered agreement allowing
PLO members to exit Lebanon.69 On September 16, the Phalangist militia surrounded the camp
and began brutally killing Palestinians, whom they accused of having ties to the PLO, for forty
hours, followed by Israel firing into the camp at nightfall.70 The Phalangists, supported by the
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IDF, were met with little resistance.71 For Palestinians, the cycle of oppression and injustice was
inescapable on every side- revealing itself to be more than a localized, isolated moment.
In the remaining decades of the twentieth century, the land in Israel-Palestine witnessed
two Palestinian uprisings (the first and second intifadas), Israel’s signing of a peace deal with
Jordan, the signings of the Oslo Accords, and the rise of Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, and many
other local, Palestinian-aligned militant and political organizations. Today, the consequences of
the intifadas, normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Arab states, and longstanding
oppression of Palestinians by the Israeli government remain. All consequences considered, the
establishment of the Israeli state in Palestine has become central to the rhetoric and grand
strategies of transnational Salafi jihadi organizations.
1.3 Research Methods and Limitations
In order to investigate my research question, I am taking a qualitative approach and will
study open-source Salafi jihadi recruitment propaganda, particularly those of Al Qaeda and ISIS,
in the form of magazines published in both English and Arabic. I will also use Abdullah Azzam’s
books, specifically Join the Caravan and Defense of Muslim Lands, and a selection of primary
sources in Arabic such as government agency reports, speeches, and previously conducted
interviews. I will further examine primary sources from Jihadology, such as newsletters,
correspondence, press releases, and nasheeds (anthems) originally published by ISIS and other
Salafi jihadi organizations. By analyzing a comprehensive selection of both primary English and
Arabic sources from current Salafi jihadi dialogues, I will add to the gap in literature surrounding
the organizational and motivational influences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on transnational
Salafi jihad by focusing on the inner mechanisms that draw organizational or motivational
inspiration from the conflict. Further, I will examine how the above recruitment materials portray
71 Shahid, “The Sabra and Shatila Massacres.”
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Palestine and how both Al Qaeda and ISIS differ in terms of ideology and grand strategy
regarding the conflict.
There is not a strong reason to use an excess of quantitative data in my project, nor is it
available or would be particularly useful. This thesis seeks to establish that Israel’s occupation
has contributed to the rise of and continues to fuel transnational Salafi jihad by analyzing
recently published magazines and printed materials; thus there is not a need to prove this
hypothesis via quantitative methods. As such, I am reliant on the above qualitative data. While
there is a plethora of information on jihadist recruitment, marketing methods, and history, there
is remarkably less work done on the influence of the Palestinian question on the organizational
innerworkings of Salafi jihadist organizations and even less studies on Palestinian Salafi jihadist
leaders aside from Azzam. Therefore, my goal is to fill this gap in literature by analyzing current,
unclassified primary materials and the comprehensive history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and its intersection with the revival of Salafi jihad in order to speak to the organizational and
motivational influences of the conflict on the proliferation and evolution of transnational Salafi
jihad.
Current literature on the influence of Palestine on Salafi jihadism is limited to
biographies of Abdullah Azzam, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al Banna, and others who have
contributed their highly popular and controversial teachings and ideologies to the movement.72 I
will be heavily utilizing the biographies and analyses of these ideologues- Abdullah Azzam in
particular- in order to support my research question. However, I aim to add to the current
literature by discussing the organizational and motivational implications of the conflict and how
72 Hegghammer and Wagemakers,“The Palestine Effect.”




Palestine is used by both Al Qaeda and ISIS as part of each organization’s respective grand
strategy. In order to do so, I examine Salafi jihadi recruitment methods, ideologies, literature,
political involvement, and relationships with Palestinian-based militant jihadi organizations.
Salafi jihadi ideologues are a major part of looking at the conflict as a whole, however they are
not the root of the phenomenon.
There is also scholarship denoting the rise of global Salafi jihad to populist pan-Islamism,
Iran’s Islamic revolution, the rise of anti-Semitism, and the steady decline of Arab nationalism in
the mid twentieth century.73 However, these assertions are largely neglected and understudied in
the current literature.
Hegghammer, the foremost scholar on Abdullah Azzam and the first to write on the
“Palestine effect,” has attributed the rise of transnational Salafi jihad to Azzam’s influence and
leadership and the subsequent role of Palestinians in Salafi jihadi circles.74 In regard to the
“Palestine effect,” he takes a historical approach by analyzing influentials from the Palestinian
diaspora that have contributed to transnational Salafi jihad.75 While I agree with Hegghammer in
that Azzam’s life had and continues to have remarkable influence on transnational Salafi jihad, I
hesitate to give Azzam all of the credit for proliferating the transnational movement. He was a
Palestinian who acted as a vessel to internationalize the movement via his ideological
contributions, but it was the question of Palestine and war in present-day Israel that drove and
75 Hegghammer and Wagemakers, “The Palestine Effect.”
74 Hegghammer and Wagemakers, “The Palestine Effect.”
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continues to drive the evolving Salafi jihadi narrative. The “vessels,” while important, were not
and are not individually influential and powerful enough to single-handedly sustain a steadily
growing, international movement. Therefore, I intend to examine how the domestic and regional
consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have contributed to transnational Salafi jihad via
the internal mechanisms, organization, goals, and strategies of prominent international Salafi
jihadi organizations- ISIS and Al Qaeda.
Lastly, the historical accounts and hagiagraphies of prominent ideologues and leaders in
the Salafi jihadi movement are inconsistent. I recognize that I will have to engage in substantial
fact-checking and read many sources on the same subject or leader in order to present
historically sound analyses. Further, a substantial amount of research is conducted in Arabic, so
there is the risk of misinterpretation. In order to minimize the risk of mistranslation, I have
utilized vetted English translations of sources originally published in Arabic.
Section 1.4 Overview of Chapters
In chapter two, I analyze the life and upbringing of Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) and his
leadership of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, relationship with Osama Bin Laden,
U.S.-sponsored tours for mujahideen recruitment in the United States, significant ideological
influence on Bin Laden, and Join the Caravan and Defense of Muslim Lands. In regard to
Azzam’s literature, I specifically analyze his usage of Palestine as being central to modern Salafi
jihadi movements. l end with an analysis of Azzam’s strategic ideological influence (both direct
and indirect) on the likes of Maqdisi, Zarqawi, Yassin, and Bin Laden.
In chapter three, I examine the history, scope, and leadership of Al Qaeda Central. I go on
to discuss its motivational and organizational connections to Palestine by analyzing Al Qaeda’s
usage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in its recruitment propaganda and ideology. In order to
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argue for the organizational connection, I analyze Al Qaeda’s connections and influence with
Salafi jihadi groups based in Palestine. In addition, I connect the historical connection to
Palestine to the motivational and organizational links via Azzam. Lastly, I examine the usage of
Islamic apocalyptic literature and nasheeds in Al Qaeda’s recruitment strategy and analyze how
the organization is connected to Palestine on every level- historical, motivational, and
organizational.
In chapter four, I analyze the history, scope, and leadership of the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria. I then discuss its motivational connection to Palestine by examining its
English-printed propaganda magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah. Then, I will look at how ISIS is
gaining influence in Palestine with anti-Hamas Salafi jihadi cells in Gaza in order to assess ISIS’
organizational connection to Palestine. Lastly, I demonstrate how ISIS’ connection to and
utilization of Palestine in its propaganda and grand strategy differs from that of Al Qaeda.
Specifically, I examine the role of ISIS’ Palestine nasheed and its emphasis on apocalyptic
literature and religious justification.
I conclude the findings of my research in chapter five by analyzing how both Al Qaeda
and ISIS frame Palestine in their respective recruitment propaganda and grand strategies. In
particular, I focus on how Palestine is used by both organizations as justification for two different
movements and, therefore, end goals. I also examine the future impact of the occupation of
Palestine on Salafi jihadi movements with a focus on the potential implications of Israel’s
annexation plans. Lastly, I assess gaps.
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Chapter II: Defense of Muslim Lands
Section 2.1 The life and death of Abdullah Azzam
Before the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Al Qaeda gained international followings
and global attention, before 9/11 and Bin Laden’s proliferation onto the world stage as the United
State’s most-wanted man and the justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the War on
Terror, was the man who laid the ideological foundations of modern, globalized, Salafi jihad:
Abdullah Azzam.
In order to understand the breadth of the motivational and organizational influences of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on transnational Salafi jihad, it is necessary to discuss the historical
influences of the conflict and, specifically, one of the movement’s most influential leaders.
Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian leader of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, made monumental
ideological contributions to the revival of global Salafi jihad. Due in part to the dissemination of
his books, Defense of Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan, the case of Palestine became
intertwined with the proliferation of Salafi jihad and its globalization. Propelled into Salafi jihad
due to his experiences in the Israeli-occupied city of Jenin in Palestine, stint with the PLO in
Jordan, and resentment toward Arab governments and their failures in the Palestinian struggle,
Azzam quickly rose through the ranks of Islamic scholarship and became one of the foremost
leaders in the twentieth century revival of transnational Salafi jihad.76 Azzam’s roles in
mobilizing the mujahideen in Afghanistan, ideologically legitimizing Hamas, and laying the
ideological foundations for Al Qaeda have thus contributed to the endurance of the modern
transnational Salafi jihadi movement fueled by the question of Palestine.
76 Thomas Hegghammer, "'Abdallah Azzam and Palestine," Norweigian Defense Research Establishment (2013):
1-31.
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The “Imam of Jihad” was born in the village of al Silat al Harithiyya (near Jenin) in the
West Bank in 1941.77 Born into a modest family of farmers, Azzam grew up under the legacy of
resistance and insurgency- as the Arab Revolt of the 1930s was still relevant in the community’s
collective memory.78 Roughly ten years after the Palestinian Arab Revolt, the 1947 United
Nations Partition Plan for Palestine prompted another Arab insurgency that lasted from
December 1947 to May 1948 when Israel declared its independence in Palestine.79
While Azzam’s family was physically unaffected by the political violence in Jenin in
1948, they lost most of their ancestral farming land and his memoirs attest to the atrocities
Jewish militias committed against local Palestinian farming families.80 Further, the humanitarian
crisis (al-Nakba)81 that ensued deeply affected Azzam by sowing seeds of resentment towards the
Israeli state and the Jewish people. Azzam’s early experiences in Palestine would eventually fuel
his dogmatic call to defend Muslim lands as fard ‘ayn (individual obligation) and inform his
mission and leadership in the Soviet-Afghan War.
Following the Arab-Israeli War, Azzam enrolled in Khadoorie Agricultural College in
Tulkarm.82 The college was funded by a Jewish Iraqi philanthropist by the name of Ellis
Khadoorie and was built in order to bolster British colonial interests.83 Ironically, the Palestinian
“Imam of Global Jihad” was educated at a school with Jewish roots. Upon graduating from the
Khadoorie school, Azzam moved to Jordan in order to teach in the small town of Adir, only to
83 Tamar Novick and Arie M. Dubnov, “The unknown history of a Palestinian school funded by an Iraqi Jew,” +972
Magazine, Haokets, February 25, 2017.
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return to Jenin.84 His burgeoning interest in Islamic law led him to pursue a bachelor’s degree in
Islamic Law in Syria at Damascus University, where he studied remotely from Jenin and
graduated in 1966.85
The Six Day War of 1967 drastically shifted the trajectory of Azzam’s life. Due to the
Israeli military occupation in Jenin, he fled to Jordan where he took refuge in Zarqa before
permanently relocating to Amman in order to reunite with his family.86 Shortly after arriving in
Jordan in 1967, Azzam joined the Jordanian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), where he learned from Al Banna’s ideas of localized struggle and the
faction’s services and activities.87
His developing ideology thus became rooted in justice for the Palestinian people, along
with hatred of the Israeli state. Essentially, the Six Day War radicalized his thought process and
activated his teachings on returning to the Golden Age of Islam, therefore setting the direction
for the rest of his life in Islamic scholarship, Palestinian activism, and the pursuit of jihad.88
Early Jihad
While Azzam was initially drawn to the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan Al
Banna, and his idea of a global expansion of Islam with roots in the Nile, he quickly grew
disillusioned with the IAF’s methodology and plans for a distinctly localized ideological
expansion in Jordan that did not seek to change existing power structures or focus on Palestinian
liberation.89 Further, the IAF vocally supported the Hashemite Monarchy and was both
underprepared and unwilling to take tangible action against Israel.90 As for Azzam, his vision
90 Lea-Henry, “The Life and Death.”
89 Calvert, "The Striving Sheikh."
88 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The new global threat: transnational salafis and jihad,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 4 (2001):
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revolved around Palestine and his overarching vision of globalized Muslim unity with Palestine
at the center.91 Disillusioned with the IAF, Azzam slowly disaffiliated only to later find a new
home in Afghanistan.
In the meanwhile, Azzam joined the fedayeen (PLO) in Jordan and gained his first
combat experiences fighting the IDF in Palestine.92 His stint in the fedayeen was short-lived,
however, as it dissolved in 1970 after the Black September. After actively fighting for the
Palestinian cause, Azzam spent the next decade quietly furthering his education in Islamic law
and thought.
Later Education
After the dissolvement of the fedayeen, Azzam began his doctoral studies at Al Azhar
University in Cairo- the most prestigious Islamic university in the world- where he graduated
with a PhD in Islamic Jurisprudence in 1973.93 Azzam returned to Jordan where he taught at the
College of Sharia Law at the University of Jordan until he was fired for his pro-Palestinain
rhetoric that challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy in 1980.94 He then moved to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where he taught Islamic Law at King Abd Al-Aziz University. He only
taught at Abd Al-Aziz University for one year before assuming another professorship at the
International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan.95 However, after a few months in
Pakistan, he permanently relocated to Afghanistan to recruit and train the mujahideen.96
Section 2.2 Afghanistan and Bin Laden
Azzam’s involvement and commitment to the war in Afghanistan- though outwardly
appearing to contradict his grand strategy of liberating Palestine- actually reaffirmed his
96 McGregor, “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone.’”
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commitment to Palestine and the liberation of Muslim lands. According to Azzam in his book,
The Defense of Muslim Lands:
Whoever can, from among the Arabs, fight jihad in Palestine, then he must start
there. And, if he is not capable, then he must set out for Afghanistan. For the rest of the
Muslims, I believe they should start their jihad in Afghanistan. It is our opinion that we
should begin with Afghanistan before Palestine, not because Afghanistan is more
important than Palestine, not at all, Palestine is the foremost Islamic problem. It is the
heart of the Islamic world, and it is a blessed land but, there are some reasons which
make Afghanistan the starting point.97
Therefore, the issue of Palestine remained at the core of Azzam’s reasoning to join the
“jihad against the unbelievers” in Afghanistan, as he sought to establish a unified Muslim body
that would spread to Palestine. Azzam argues that it is fard ‘ayn (individual responsibility) on
each Muslim to fight where there is the most imminent need and opportunity.98 Hence, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict drove Azzam’s motives to conduct jihad in Afghanistan and fueled his
operations throughout the duration of the Soviet-Afghan War.
Azzam became the main leader and mobilizer of Arab foreign fighters and provided them
with weapons, tools, and trained them in his bases throughout the region.99 He also established
the maktab al-khidmat (Services Bureau) in order to house foreign fighters and publish his books
and fatwas.100 Azzam used funding from both Osama Bin Laden and the CIA in order to train and
equip the mujahideen.101 Further, the United States sponsored Azzam and his recruiting trips to
50 U.S. states for the mobilization of Arab foreign fighters in the mid-1980s.102 Generous
funding from the U.S. and private donors further legitimized Azzam’s ideological mission and
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organization of the maktab al khadmat.103 Meanwhile in Afghanistan, Azzam’s reunion with his
former student, Osama Bin Laden, became the part of the foundation for the transnationalization
of the Palestine connection to modern jihad.104
Before meeting Azzam, Bin Laden was ideologically aimless and had no spiritual
authority or standing.105 Born into a wealthy, well-connected family in Riyadh, Bin Laden grew
up close to the Saudi royal family and had no predisposition to Salafi jihad until his encounter
with Azzam at King Abdul Aziz University. 106 As a student of Azzam and surrounded by a
plethora of Islamic fundamentalist-leaning peers, Bin Laden became indoctrinated by Azzam’s
call to a revival of Muslim unity and a return to the “Golden Age of Islam.”107
Therefore, the man who would inherit- albeit controversially- the globally reknowned
Salafi jihadist organization, Al Qaeda, was invented. While Bin Laden is typically given credit
for the rise of Salafi jihadi activities in the 1980s and until his death, it was Azzam who initially
indoctrinated Bin Laden and pioneered the establishment of Al Qaeda. Therefore, Azzam gave
Al Qaeda spiritual authority and legitimacy that it would have otherwise lacked.
In Afghanistan, Azzam also met Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi, the influential
Jordanian-Palestinian Salafi jihadi ideologue who would become the mentor of Abu Musab Al
Zarqawi.108 Azzam and Maqdisi shared a common Palestinian heritage, however Maqdisi
distanced himself from Azzam and his teachings, as he was keener to a quietest approach to
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jihad.109 While Maqdisi closely adhered to the quietest sect of Salafism, quietest salafism does
not formally forbid Salafi jihad and quietest adherents do not typically engage in violent jihad.110
Although Maqdisi would never engage in violent behavior himself, his mentee,
Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, would disregard his advice and go on to establish
Al Qaeda in Iraq, which eventually developed into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).111
Therefore, Zarqawi became more closely associated with Azzam’s extremist expressions of jihad
in the end.
Overall, the last decade of Azzam’s life in Afghanistan proved to be his most influential.
Azzam’s intentions in pursuing jihad in Afghanistan over the jihad in Palestine was justified in
his belief that Palestine is at the center, therefore the mujahideen would go on to pursue jihad
against the Jews in Palestine after the liberation of the Afghans from the Soviets.112 Notably,
Azzam’s partnership with Bin Laden shaped the trajectory of transnational jihad and ensured that
Palestine would be a constant feature in the ideology of transnational jihad.
Further, Azzam published several books and essays including Join the Caravan, Defense
of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Faith, and Hamas: Historical Roots and Charter-
among many other essays and articles circulated among jihadi groups and in Al-Jihad
Magazine.113 Azzam’s work in Afghanistan therefore connected the Palestinian cause to Salafi
jihad and permanently fixed the issue as a pillar of modern Salafi jihadi literature.
Section 2.3 Azzam’s literature
Abdullah Azzam’s books, The Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman
and Join the Caravan are ideological hallmarks of the transnational Salafi jihadi movement and
113 Hegghammer, “Abdullah Azzam and Palestine.”
112 Defense of Muslim Lands by Abdullah Azzam (Shaheed).
111 Ibid.
110 Wagemakers, A Quietest Jihadi.
109 Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, (N.p.:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
26
still circulated amongst the ranks of Al Qaeda and ISIS today. The common thread throughout
each book is the incumbent call upon every Muslim to wage jihad wherever there is opportunity
as connected to the grand strategy of liberating Palestine. In Defense of Muslim Lands (al Dfa’a
3n Eraadi al Muslimeen), Azzam argues that defensive jihad is fard a’ayn upon every Muslim
near or living in the land which the kuffar (unbelievers) have taken.114 This call is echoed in the
creeds of both ISIS and Al Qaeda (aqida wa almanhaj), but more clearly addressed in the Creed
and Path of the Islamic State. In lines 8-9 of the Creed and Path of ISIS, Azzam’s call is clear:
We believe that jihad in God’s path is an individual obligation, from the fall of al-Andalus until
the liberation of [all] Muslim lands, and [that it is an individual obligation] in the presence of a
pious person or an impious person. And [we believe that] the greatest of sins after disbelief in
God is barring from jihad in God’s path at the time when it is an individual obligation.115
These sentiments are echoed in the Creed and Path of Al Qaeda:
This jihad is accomplished by a single individual or more, and will not be stopped by the tyranny
of the oppressors or the defeatist talk of the demoralizers.116
Taking into consideration Azzam’s ties to Palestine and involvement in the war in
Afghanistan, his sentiments expressed regarding the oppressor are in reference to both Palestine
and Afghanistan. He expands on this further in The Defense of Muslim Lands:
Whoever can, from among the Arabs, fight jihad in Palestine, then he must start there. And, if he
is not capable, then he must set out for Afghanistan. For the rest of the Muslims, I believe they
should start their jihad in Afghanistan. It is our opinion that we should begin with Afghanistan
before Palestine, not because Afghanistan is more important than Palestine, not at all, Palestine is
the foremost Islamic problem.117
Azzam reasons that the jihad in Afghanistan is obligatory before Palestine at this moment in
history because of the sheer opportunity. In Afghanistan, the mujahideen are trained to fight, thus
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making them better suited for the end goal of fighting the oppressor in Palestine. Azzam also
clarifies that Palestine is the “foremost Islamic problem,” but goes on to argue that the fight in
Palestine has become a secular movement driven by a variety of individuals (Muslims,
nationalists, communists).118 Hence, he argues that the Palestinian fight has been appropriated
whereas Islamists initiated the fight in Afghanistan.119 Taking cues from Salafist ideology, he
thus views the struggle in Palestine as purely Islamic in nature and uses the political and
religious diversity of its current liberation movement as a means to discredit its legitimacy:
The situation has become a game in the hands of the great powers. Gambling with the land, the
people and the land of Palestine, pursuing them even into the Arab states, until their military
power is exhausted. There are more than 3000 kms of open border in Afghanistan and regions of
tribes not under political influence. This forms a protective shield for mujahideen. However, in
Palestine the situation is entirely different. The borders are closed, their hands are bound, the
eyes of the authorities spy from all sides for anyone who attempts to infiltrate its borders to kill
the Jews.120
Azzam’s disillusionment with the manipulation of Palestine by the world powers and realization
of the futility of using the current moment to retake Al Aqsa culminates in his final points about
Palestine and vision of a transnational jihadi movement:
If only the Muslims would apply their Allah’s command and implement the laws of their Shariah
concerning the General March for just one week in Palestine, Palestine would be completely
purified of Jews... Unfortunately, when we think about Islam we think nationally. We fail to let
our vision pass beyond geographic borders that have been drawn up for us by the Kuffar.121
Today, the above excerpts from Azzam’s most notable book, The Defense of Muslim
Lands, are critical to understanding the “Palestine effect” and conection to transnational jihad.
While Azzam was the first to explicitly connect the Palestinian case to his reasoning for
engaging in defensive jihad and incorporate the issue into his doctrine, the impact of the






motivational and organizational levels by means of recruitment materials, nasheeds, poetry, and
grand strategy as well, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Regarding Azzam’s second book of interest, Join the Caravan, he expands less-so on the
call to jihad for the sake of Palestine and further expands on “responding to the call of the Lord”
and, again, freeing occupied Muslim lands from the oppressor.122 However, Join the Caravan is
still relevant, as it expounds upon several pillars of Salafi theology including: the following of
the pious predecessors, tawhid (the oneness of God), ensuring that unbelief is fought, and the
authority of Qur’an and Sunna.123
Section 2.4 Conclusion
Considering the life of Abdullah Azzam and his ideological contributions to transnational
Salafi jihad, it is clear that his focus on Palestine both in his books and teachings have both
indirectly and directly fueled the transnational jihadi movement. Directly, Palestine was
continuously at the center of his activities in Afghanistan and Palestine’s occupation by Israel
furthered Azzam’s arguments of jihad as fard ‘ayn throughout his repertoire. As will be
discussed in the following chapters, Azzam was not solely responsible for the rise of
transnational Salafi jihad, nor did he single-handedly cause Palestine to become the focus of the
movement. Rather, the proliferation of the Iraeli state, inadequacy of the Palestinian local
government, and the suffering of Palestinians at the hands of the Israelis both motivationally and
organizationally fuel modern transnational jihad.
123 Azzam, “Join the Caravan.”
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122 Abdlullah Azzam, “Join the Caravan,” [al huq bilqafila].
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Chapter III: Al Qaeda
“Jihad is a duty to liberate Al-Aqsa, and to help the powerless in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon and
in every Muslim country.”124
Section 3.1 Early history
According to most sources, Al Qaeda was formed between 1987-1988 as a splinter group
of Azzam’s maktab al-khadmat125 and led by Bin Laden.126 Bin Laden was not merely the
financier of maktab al-khadmat, which led to rifts in his relationship with Bin Laden in the late
1980s.127 Rather, he was a militarist with a vision for a unified Arab militant organization,
whereas Azzam tended to take a centrist, neutral approach to military engagement.128 Further,
discrepancies in strategy and vision between Bin Laden and Azzam led to the splintering off of
Bin Laden’s group from the maktab al-khadmat, as Bin Laden was more concerned with the
caliber of military training and funding than his counterpart, Azzam, who envisioned maktab
al-khadmat as the first step towards establishing a modern Islamic state with Palestine at the
center.129 In the end, Bin Laden became captivated by the region of Jaji in the northeast and
decided to set up his camp there- despite concerns of the area’s exposed location overlooking
enemy frontlines.130 Bin Laden went on to recruit Egyptian foreign fighters- one of whom would
become Al Qaeda’s first military commander (Abu Ubaydah al Banshiri).131 With the addition of
131 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
129 Farrall, “Revisiting al-Qaida’s Foundation.”
Hegghammer, “Mujahid.”
128 Thomas Hegghammer, “Mujahid,” in The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad,” (Cambridge
University Press, 2020): 328-368.
127 Lea‐Henry, "The Life and Death.”
126 Leah Farrall, “Revisiting al-Qaida’s Foundation and Early History,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no.6 (2017):
17-37.
125 “Bureau of Services”
124 Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Al Jazeera Interview, 2002.
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/.
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al Banshiri and several Egyptian Jihad-affiliated recruits to Bin Laden’s ranks, Al Qaeda132
quickly started to become a  reality.
While initially led and managed by Bin Laden, who was predominantly focused on
effective military training and rising up against Arab governments at the time, Al Qaeda
nonetheless came to embody the vision of Azzam in the end.133 After Azzam’s assassination in
1989, Al Qaeda continued to mobilize and organize under the influence of Azzam’s Defense of
Muslim Lands, which provided the early organization with the ideological framework and vision
by which to build and sustain a transnational movement.
Today, the ideals upheld by Defense of Muslim Lands continue to guide Al Qaeda’s grand
strategy and inform its propaganda. Notably, in AQAP’s (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
magazine, Inspire, the ideas of Defense of Muslim Lands and the liberation of Palestine (and
subsequent emancipation of masjid al aqsa) are prominent themes in each issue. Remarkably, the
usage and AQAP’s portrayal of Palestine in Inspire denotes an inherently localized agenda and
grand strategy within the bounds of a transnational movement. As quoted by Abu Musab Al
Zarqawi at the end of each issue (albeit ironically), “Here we start and in Jerusalem we meet.”134
As will be discussed in detail in this chapter, the vision of Azzam to create a transnational
movement that would function as a state and establish a front around Palestine to retake
Jerusalem is central to the messaging of Inspire and functions as both a motivational and
organizational means of creating a unified front around Palestine- using Palestine as a regional
“connector,” and common rallying point. Further, as
Section 3.2 Magazine analysis
134 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Inspire, no. 2. (2010).
133 R. Kim Cragin, “Early History of Al Qa’ida,” The Historical Journal 51, no. 4 (2008): 1047-1067.
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Inspire, first published in English by Al Malahem Media in the Fall of 2010, is a
propaganda tool of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that ran until 2017. Currently, there are
seventeen printed issues in English, all with Arabic translations. In order to analyze the magazine
issues, I specifically looked for articles on Palestine, grand strategy, and ideological connections
to Palestine. I also measured the number of times “Palestine,” “Palestinians,” “Israel,” “Israelis,”
“Jews,” and “Zionist/ism” were mentioned. While this data points to a larger picture of the role
of Palestine in Al Qaeda’s organization and transnationality, I particularly looked at how each
mention, article, and/or quote pertaining to Palestine and/or Israel connected transnational Salafi
jihad to the Palestinian issue as a motivational and/or organizational influence.
Regarding Al Qaeda’s portrayal and usage of Palestine in Inspire, the Palestinian issue is
a significant motivational factor for joining the jihad, as most eloquently expressed in the
articles, “Palestine: Betrayal of Human Conscience” (Issue 12) and “Let Us Unite for Palestine”
(Issue 15). Contrary to its competitor, ISIS, Al Qaeda elaborates on the issue of Palestine as a
human rights issue and asserts that sympathy for the Palestinian cause suffices a means to
engage in jihad against Israelis and perpetuators of the Jewish state.135 In addition, my findings
reveal that Palestine plays a larger role as both a motivational and organizational factor than
simply improving the image of Al Qaeda.
Section 3.3 Inspire
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine draws on both current events and
history to portray the liberation of Palestine as incumbent upon all Muslims. In particular, it
reflects the intentions of Osama Bin Laden in which he equates attacks on the West with attacks
on Israel. Hence, the glorification of 9/11 is a prominent theme throughout the series, as well as
135 Samir Khan, “Palestine: Betrayal of the Human Conscience,” in Inspire: Shattered: A Story About Change 12
(2014): 23-24.
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imagery related to Palestine in general. Unlike the magazines of ISIS, AQAP’s series uses heroic
language to describe the spiritual blessing and personal benefit of engaging in jihad for the sake
of the ummah and Palestine. In particular, issue 15 publishes the article, “Let us unite for
Palestine,” which states that Muslims are to target the West and all Israel supporters as part of the
movement to liberate Palestine.
In addition, Inspire includes many excerpts from famous leaders in the U.S. government
to highlight their hypocrisy and why Al Qaeda affiliates should attack Western interests in order
to “fight for Palestine.” Essentially, it has never been about the West. It has always been about
Palestine in the eyes of Al Qaeda and its late leader, Osama Bin Laden.
In waging war on the U.S. and its interests, Al Qaeda frames itself as “cutting off the
head of the snake” (the U.S.) so that it can move in on Israel and take Palestine. Further, Inspire
reveals that the grand strategy of the organization has maintained consistency over time, unlike
younger and less established Salafi jihadi organizations- Jerusalem has always been at the center
of its objectives. Notably, before the mysterious death of Bin Laden’s son, Hamza Bin Laden, in
2019, Hamza announced in an audio message release that “Jerusalem is a bride whose dowry is
our blood.”136
Section 3.4 The Palestine nasheed
Nasheeds, Islamic hymns used by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda as a messaging and
propaganda tool, consistently draw on Jerusalem as a means to inspire men and women to join
their respective ranks. In the case of Al Qaeda’s strategy, nasheeds are used to incite strong
emotions toward a particular issue or characteristic of God. Thus, in this instance, the nasheed is





used as a call to engage in jihad for the sake of liberating Palestine. In particular, the “Palestine
nasheed” has grown in popularity thanks to the propaganda of Hamas in the wake of the First
Palestinian Intifada in the late 1980s.137 While Hamas has always been at odds with Al Qaeda
and ISIS, its propaganda and recruitment strategies have informed a bulk of the ideological and
strategic anecdotes in its enemies’ recruitment propaganda.
Specifically, Al Qaeda has used the Palestine nasheed as a means of both advertising the
dire situation of a majority of Palestinians and recruiting mujahideen to join Al Qaeda for the
sake of Palestine. In the nasheed, Sahm al ams (Arrow of Yesterday), Al Qaeda portrays a deep
longing for Jerusalem and an endurance in jihad that is explicitly connected to Jerusalem:
Yesterday’s arrow still remains, buried in my heart.
And the wounds in my ribs, I hide it O Jerusalem!
I walk with fear, and the humiliation overburdens me.
But I will never be chained up by despair!
What type of crimes have been committed in your sacred land
And the land has been polluted by those who want its destruction
My mistake is that I, O Jerusalem, long ago,
I was tempted by wealth and illusions and trophies.
I will walk with fear, and the humiliation overburdens me.
But I will never be chained up by despair.138
In using the Palestine nasheed for recruitment purposes, Al Qaeda reiterates its
commitment to Palestine’s liberation and uses it to instill a sense of moral obligation to “leave
everything behind” to liberate Palestine. Therefore, this nasheed in particular asserts that the
liberation of Palestine is reason to engage in jihad. Further, it frames Palestine as a moral issue,
therefore equating the liberation of Palestine with moral obligation.
Section 3.5 Organizational links
138 MercifulServant, “Arrows of Yesterday- Castillo Nasheeds,” YouTube video, 3:42, September 26, 2016.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUGG9eQ0wnQ.
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Jund Ansar Allah, a former Salafi jihadi group based in Gaza, pledged allegiance to Al
Qaeda and rose in prominence within the Gaza Strip after successfully attacking Israeli security
forces in 2009.139 The organization started as a counter to Hamas and its overtly nationalist
position and was later ended by the organization it sought to counter within the next year.140
In addition, Al Qaeda has established ties with several other significant Salafi jihadi
organizations (specifically, organizations solely established to challenge Hamas’ influence) in
Gaza.141 Two of the most notable organizational linkages include Jaysh al Islam and Jaljalat.142
Jaysh al Islam (Army of Islam) emerged in 2006 as an effort to rebuke Hamas’ participation in
Palestinian elections.143 Its successes include the kidnapping of an IDF soldier in conjunction
with Hamas’ Qassem Brigades and the PRC’s Salah al Din Brigades, as well as the hostaging of
a BBC reporter and cameraman.144
On the other hand, Jaljalat (“thunder” in Arabic; also known as Ansar al Sunna) is led by
a former Hamas military commander and has goals in tandem with those of Al Qaeda: “to
maintain the ‘flame’ of jihad against Israel and to ‘purify’ Palestinian society from Western
presence and influence.”145 Further, Jaljalat acts as an umbrella for smaller, lesser-known Salafi
jihadi and Al Qaeda-inspired organizations in Gaza. Namely, Army of the Ummah Jerusalem,
The Jerusalem Jihad Warriors Movement, and The Army of Believers- Al Qaeda in Palestine.146
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A major exception to the organizational links between Al Qaeda and locally-driven
Islamic militant organizations is none other than Hamas. In fact, Al Qaeda and Hamas have been
at odds from the very beginning of each organization in the late 1980s- undoubtedly due to the
power struggle between Azzam and Bin Laden.
Al Qaeda started the feud with Hamas. Al Qaeda, ironically the embodiment of Azzam’s
vision that eventually came to be led by and most closely associated with Bin Laden, began to
view Hamas and its leadership as at odds with Al Qaeda’s unwavering values of al wala wa’l
bara (loyalty and disavowal), tawhid (the oneness of God), jihad, and Islamic land.147 This
change of heart was in response to Hamas’ victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections and truce
with Israel (in blatant contradiction to AQ’s stance on jihadi involvement in secular government
elections).148 Hence, any organizational connection between Al Qaeda and Hamas was severed
under Bin Laden’s leadership.
In reviewing primary sources (videos and press releases) from the above Gaza-based
Salafi jihadi organizations, these groups were both inspired and created in response to Al
Qaeda’s Palestine-centered globalization strategy and ideological “purity.” In effect, the
Palestine-centered propaganda strategy of Al Qaeda is directly mirrored in the respective
strategies of said Salafi jihadi organizations in Gaza. Therefore, the question of Palestine
functions as one of two organizational links between Palestinian nationalist Salafi jihadi
organizations and the broader global jihad: ideological adherence to Al Qaeda and the countering
of Hamas’ influence and leadership in Palestine.
These organizational linkages are important because they position Al Qaeda as the
“defender of Palestine” on a transnational level by reinforcing Al Qaeda’s ideological reach
148 Habeck, “Al Qa’ida and Hamas.”
147 Mary Habeck, “Al Qa’ida and Hamas: The Limits of Salafi Jihadi Pragmatism,” CTC Sentinel 3 no. 2 (2010):
1-3.
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while forming a physical front in Palestine for the purpose of liberation. In addition, Al
Qaeda-connected Salafi jihadi cells in Palestine are the embodiment of Azzam’s call to “wage
jihad wherever there is opportunity… [specifically], in Palestine.”149 Therefore, the
organizational links between Al Qaeda and Palestine are clear: Al Qaeda uses Palestine as a
liberation movement. As first exhorted by Azzam, Al Qaeda is using Palestine to recruit by
framing it as a liberation movement while, quite literally, forming a front around and within
Palestine via Al Qaeda affiliated Salafi jihadi cells.
Section 3.6 Motivational links
The motivational connection between Palestine and Al Qaeda’s transnational agenda is
not only central to, but highly effective, in Al Qaeda’s international messaging and propaganda
strategies. Specifically, Al Qaeda uses Palestine to instill a sense of moral obligation to join the
jihad in order to liberate their Muslim brothers and sisters in Palestine. This argument is most
eloquently portrayed in AQAP’s Inspire magazine. In particular, the articles “Let Us Unite For
Palestine,” “Inside Obama’s Rationality,” “Palestine: Betrayal of Human Conscience,” and
“Protect Focus” portray Palestine as a nation and land that must be liberated at all costs, a moral
obligation to all Muslims, and one of the driving motivations for Al Qaeda’s war against the
West (the United States, in particular).
In addition, Bin Laden’s statements almost always mention the liberation of Palestine. In
one of his most popular fatwas, “World Islamic Front For Jihad Against Zionists and Crusaders:
Declaration of War,” Bin Laden states:
The ruling of killing Americans and their allies- whether civilians or military- is incumbent upon
every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, in order to liberate the
149 Azzam, Defense of Muslim Lands.
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Mosque of al Aqsa and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and until their armies leave
the lands of Islam, punished according to the law, broken and unable to threaten any Muslim.150
Therefore, as it is incumbent upon every Muslim to wage war against the West and its allies, Al
Qaeda also asserts the United States as a common enemy- one in the same with Israel- as an
addition to its grand strategy of liberating Palestine. According to Bin Laden, the United States
and Israel are one in the same, which is why he encourages Al Qaeda to attack the West.151
Overall, the motivational influence of Palestine in Al Qaeda’s propaganda is undeniable-
each issue ends with the quote, “O Aqsa we are coming,” and uses graphic images of injured
Palestinian children and teenagers in an effort to invoke a sense of duty to joining international
jihad for the sake of eventually liberating Palestine.
Section 3.7 Al Qaeda, “Defender of Palestine”
AL Qaeda has thus positioned itself to be the imminent “Defender of Palestine,” although
it has never actually launched an attack against Israel. Nonetheless, it intentionally seeks to
overshadow this fact and support this blatant performance gap by attacking the West/Western
interests and equating these attacks with attacks on Israel. In reality, Israel would not exist
without the United States- hence, Al Qaeda views the U.S. as the most enduring obstacle to its
strategy of liberating Palestine. The most notable instances of such attacks on the West are
embodied in 9/11, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, and the Khobar Towers attacks in
Saudi Arabia. Until Bin Laden’s assassination in 2011, he asserted that the “Zionist-Crusader”
alliance (Israel and the United States) is the biggest threat to the Islamic Caliphate- which is still
true over ten years later.
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Therefore, Al Qaeda uses Palestine as both a moral and religious justification for carrying
out jihad on an international level in an effort to liberate Palestine. Hence, Palestine is used by Al
Qaeda as a liberation movement, as the organization frames the issue as fard ‘ayn- a moral duty
upon every Muslim. In addition, the moral and therefore motivational influence of Palestine on
transnational Salafi jihad is emphasized throughout Al Qaeda’s propaganda as it is pitted against
Western powers, the United States in particular, as Israel would be unable to survive without the
military and intelligence backing of the United States.
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Chapter Ⅳ: The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
Section 4.1 The emergence of the Islamic State
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh)152 was born of a combination of the
paroxysms of the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003, Arab Spring revolutions of 2011-2013, and the
Syrian civil war.153 Essentially, the product of over a decade of regional socio-political pressures
culminating in U.S. policy decisions that opened the door for ISIS to successfully establish a
caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Specifically, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late founder and leader of
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, used the U.S.’ (convenient) War on Terror and invasion of
Iraq to provoke the sectarian rifts necessary to induce civil war between Sunnis and Shiites in the
“cradle of civilization.”154
In order to understand how ISIS became a reality and eventually became intertwined with
Al Qaeda and Bin Laden- thus furthering the Palestinian liberation agenda- it is necessary to first
understand the life and motivations of its founder and strategical mastermind, Abu Musab al
Zarqawi. Zarqawi, a non-affluent Palestinian-Jordanian raised in Zarqa, Jordan, first engaged in
jihad as a foreign fighter against “Afghan communism” in 1990.155 It was in his training camp in
Pakistan where he met Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi (also Palestinian-Jordanian), the foremost
Salafi jihadi scholar at the time.156 After returning to Jordan, Maqdisi and Zarqawi met again and
were alleged to have been planning an attack on Israel in 1994, leading to their respective arrests
156 Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life.”
155 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July/August 2006.
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by the Jordanian mukhabarat.157 After being released from prison, Maqdisi stayed in Jordan
while Zarqawi went against his mentor’s wishes and traveled to Afghanistan and Iraq to engage
in jihad.158 According to Maqdisi, however, Zarqawi was “not knowledgeable enough… and his
efforts were too unorganized to be successful [in jihad].”159 Further, Zarqawi differed from
Maqdisi in that his perception of the foremost enemy was Shi’ism rather than the foreign invader
(e.g. the West) as had always been prioritized by Al Qaeda.160
As it turns out, Maqdisi was right: Zarqawi was never a visionary like Bin Laden, Azzam,
or Zawahiri. Rather, he was overtly focused on his immediate surroundings and local
circumstances and thus eventually centered his war strategy in the circumstances around him,
never outwards.161 When Zarqawi met Bin Laden in Iraq in the early 2000s, he initially refused to
pledge allegiance to him or join Al Qaeda unless the organization changed its plan of action to
mirror his own: annihilation of the Shi’ites first.162 Unwilling to collaborate with Al Qaeda due to
ideological and strategic differences, Zarqawi started his own training camp to recruit
Palestinians and Jordanians to the jihad in Iraq, calling it al tawhid wa al jihad.163 Eventually,
however, it became clear to both Bin Laden and Zarqawi that they needed each other’s respective
organizations to survive and maintain legitimacy- thus, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Bin
Laden, was appointed as an amir, and Al Qaeda in Iraq was born.164
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Especially in 2003-2004 Iraq, Zarqawi’s strategic emphasis on the local worked because
the U.S. unsolicitedly brought the war to his own backyard, therefore legitimizing ISIS’
ideology, emphasis on establishing an Islamic state, and driving up recruitment.165 When the U.S.
invaded Iraq in 2003, the foundations were laid for the proliferation of new substate militant
organizations and the entrance of militant organizations already in existence- enter Al Qaeda and
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq, which would later change its name to The Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria, initially used AQI solely to carry out his rage against Shi’ites. However, as he
was under the spiritual guidance of Bin Laden, his strategy eventually evolved to target
Westerners, especially Americans, in Iraq. Zarqawi’s strategy, therefore, was designed to target
whatever enemy was in his immediate surroundings.166 Thus, in terms of grand strategy, ISIS’
agenda began as the inverse of Al Qaeda’s: destruction of the near enemy (as opposed to
destruction of the far enemy) and really only evolved under the prodding of Bin Laden.167
While the grand strategy of ISIS has evolved to mirror a more internationally-focused
agenda after the death of Zarqawi, subsequent changes in leadership, and the fall of the caliphate
in 2015, its strategy still differs from Al Qaeda’s regarding the sheer significance of Palestine.
Rather than focusing on the literal liberation of Jerusalem, ISIS’ propaganda focuses on the
annihilation of Jews and Christians everywhere in order to achieve the liberation of Palestine.
Therefore, ISIS’ inclusion and portrayal of Palestine within its propaganda and new strategy is
still significant and relevant to the purposes of this thesis, as will be discussed in the following
sections.
Section 4.2 Magazine analysis
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In order to analyze how Palestine plays into ISIS’ propaganda and grand strategy, I
examined their English and Arabic print magazines, Al Dabiq and Rumiya, as well as a number
of nasheeds used by ISIS for recruitment purposes. A common theme throughout these
magazines and nasheeds is the Islamic apocalyptic narrative: Jews allying with Dajjal (the
Islamic antichrist), living in Jerusalem, and conspiring against Islam.168 The point being: Muslims
must have control of Jerusalem for end times events to take place, according to Islamic
eschatology.169 Currently, this is not the case- which is why ISIS, in particular, does not ally itself
with Hamas, the Palestinian Authority- or any other Arab government for that matter- as they are
seen as traitors of Islam and Palestine. In addition, Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi,
released a statement to the Jewish people in 2015 and announced:
“God caused the Jews of the world to gather in Israel, and the war against them has become easy.
It is the obligation of every Muslim to carry out Jihad… Jews, you will not enjoy in Palestine.
God has gathered you in Palestine so that the Mujahadeen can reach you soon and you will hide
by the rock and the tree. Palestine will be your graveyard.”170
ISIS therefore asserts itself as an “end times army” and portrays this image in its
recruitment propaganda through gruesome pictures of war, beheadings, suicide bombings, and
martyrs of Islam. Further, ISIS uses both the Bible and Torah to validate its arguments about the
end times, behavior of the kuffar,171 and the purity and preeminence of Islam. By capitalizing on
the failures of Islamic governments, the hypcocrisy of the West, and the heresy of Christianity,
Judaism, Shi’ism, and all other religions and sects of Islam, ISIS asserts itself as the imminent
savior of Islam from modernity and Western values.
Section 4.3 Dabiq
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Throughout the fifteen issues of Dabiq that ran from 2014 to 2016, ISIS emphasizes the
annihilation of the Jewish and Christian peoples as its end goal. Differing from Al Qaeda’s
assertion that freeing all Muslim lands from the foreign occupier is the end goal (particularly,
liberating Palestine), ISIS asserts that the Islamic caliphate will not be truly legitimate until all of
the kuffar are annihilated, then giving ISIS the uncontested space to establish the state as foretold
in Islamic end times eschatology.
Explicitly, the content in Dabiq justifies every action of ISIS with Islam. In doing so,
ISIS attempts to create an image of religious superiority and know-all in regard to both the end
times and Islam in general. Further, its use of graphic imagery, focus on ISIS heroes and martyrs,
and emphasis on apocalyptic literature and the end times asserts ISIS as a powerful, victorious,
and vision-oriented organization.
Section 4.4 Rumiyah
The shift in style, graphic design, and messaging from Dabiq (2014-16) to Rumiyah
(2016-17) is significant: Dabiq focuses on theology and religious justification for ISIS’
long-term agenda, while Rumiyah encompasses a shorter, current-event focused dialogue that
plays to ISIS’ short-term goals and focuses on practical ways to engage in jihad anywhere in the
world (e.g. instructionals on how to select the right knife and/or car to attack crowds). In
addition, the general focus of Rumiyah is on how to plan and carry out attacks as an individual
rather than as a group. Further, apocalyptic language that was prevalent in Dabiq is largely
absent from Rumiyah issues. As will be discussed at the end of this thesis, ISIS’ history and
propaganda reveal a highly decentralized organization that lends itself towards prioritizing global
participation over globalization- the opposite of Al Qaeda.
Section 4.5 The Palestine nasheed
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Unlike the numerous and publicly available Al Qaeda affiliated Palestine nasheeds, the
ISIS version of the Palestine nasheed is less common and not as accessible due to internet
censorship. Still, the ISIS nasheed, “Oh Victory to Whoever Obtains Martyrdom” is centered
around calling Muslims to engage in jihad for the sake of Jerusalem (al Quds):
I convey a call to those strongholds
And to those that have prepared to depart
Make strong for the departure to jihad
Perhaps you will be killed for the sake of God,
or maybe you will be victorious
And perhaps you will terrorize your enemy
For al-Quds is weeping while the Jews are being insolent.172
The general focus of ISIS’ propaganda is victory for Islam as a religion, not necessarily for the
sake of a specific space or people. Therefore, the nasheeds of ISIS echo this call, particularly in
its version of the Palestine nasheed.
Section 4.6 Motivational links
Motivationally, Palestine is used by ISIS as a religious justification for engaging in jihad.
In reviewing ISIS’ magazines and a number of nasheeds, ISIS presents the Palestinian cause as
an Islamic cause, rather than a wholistic issue encompassing place, the longevity of a nation,
religion, and human rights. By presenting all Jews (and Christians) as conspirators against Islam,
ISIS provokes its followers to annihilate the kuffar in exchange for the holy land. The emphasis
placed on eradicating inferior religions and Islamic sects as preeminent, opposed to the emphasis
placed on moral obligation to fight for Palestine in the propaganda of Al Qaeda, reveals ISIS’
ultimate commitment to justifying Islam and using the liberation of Palestine to do so. This
strategy has been particularly effective for ISIS in terms of recruitment, as its recruits are drawn
172 Oh Victory to Whoever Obtains Martyrdom.
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to these issues and the promise of the religious and personal benefits that purportedly come with
ISIS’ version of Islam.173
In addition, the death of Zarqawi and shift in leadership to Baghdadi signaled a
monumental shift in strategy that included Palestine at the center. Baghdadi was more of a
visionary than Zarqawi- he believed Palestine was central to the organization’s objectives both in
the short and long term. He proved his commitment to Palestine by actively encouraging his
mujahideen to donate money and resources to Palestinians.174 However, he was also interested in
ensuring the jihad was successful in Iraq, so his strategy eventually became “establish the
caliphate in Iraq and then create the front against Israel and take Jerusalem.”175 Yes, Palestine
was a point of interest for Zarqawi as well, he saw it as the culmination of his objectives in
Iraq.176 However, he did not live to see his agenda come to fruition and Baghdadi took a more
liberal approach to the issue.
Lastly, ISIS’ former designation, AQI, used the Palestinian cause to recruit Palestinians
themselves to fight in Iraq and ultimately go back to Palestine and liberate it.177 In doing so,
AQI/ISIS incorporated Palestine’s most relevant sympathizers into its ranks. Additionally, ISIS
capitalizes on the fact that Palestine is a religious issue in which all enemies of Islam are
compliant, therefore driving its recruitment narrative and vision via the Palestinian cause.178
Section 4.7 Organizational links
178 Samar Batrawi, Jihadology Podcast: Palestinians and Global Jihad with Samar Batrawi, Jihadology, podcast
audio, August 17, 2015. https://jihadology.net/2015/08/17/palestinians-and-global-jihad-with-samar-batrawi/.
177 Gerges, “ISIS: A History.”
176 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, “Palestine: Betrayal of the Guilty Conscience,” Inspire Magazine, March
2014.
175 Ibid.
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ISIS has recently attempted to create linkages between Salafi-jihadi organizations in Gaza
and therefore infiltrate Palestinian land in order to wage war against Hamas and the Israelis from
within.179 Since ISIS frames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an Islamic cause, it has found
many anti-Hamas, religiously driven sympathizers in Gaza who also equate Hamas with Israel,
as they are both believed to be traitors of Islam.180 Explicitly, its ties to the Sheikh Omar Hadid
Brigade (also known as the Islamic State in Palestine) and the so-called “Islamic State in
Jerusalem” have been publicized in the wake of numerous Salafi jihadi attacks on Israeli security
forces in Gaza.  Therefore, ISIS is able to exploit the growing power vacuum in Gaza by
mobilizing Palestinians to establish the foundation for a caliphate in Palestine and provoke
Israeli security to the point of confrontation.181
Lastly, Al Qaeda never had the success ISIS has had in Gaza, so it eventually terminated
its efforts. ISIS, on the other hand, has delivered where Al Qaeda never did.182 ISIS has seen
great successes among Salafi jihadis in Gaza aside from recent ISIS-connected attacks against
Israel and Hamas, particularly in regard to the dissemination of its ideology. Many Salafi jihadi
groups in Gaza have been using nasheeds from ISIS’ propaganada, therefore both furthering the
agenda of ISIS and driving up recruitment objectives among Gaza’s youth.183 Further, Salafi
jihadi groups based in Gaza are mirroring ISIS and explicitly targeting Hamas in order to counter
183 Gregg Carlstrom, “Is the Islamic State on the Rise in Gaza?” Foreign Policy, June 17, 2015.
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Israel in a way that they deem successful and in agreement with their interpretation of Islam.184
Overall, Palestine has connected ISIS to the Palestinian cause on a deeply organizational level
via the dissemination of its ideology among Salafi jihadis based in Palestine and a shared disdain
of Hamas and its foreign and domestic policy decisions.





As seen in the previous two chapters, Palestine is used by Al Qaeda and ISIS as both a
liberation and annihilation movement, respectively. Al Qaeda and ISIS differ substantially in
terms of tactical strategy, ideology and rhetoric, yet Palestine is the “common denominator” and
serves the purpose of motivationally and organizationally driving the modern transnational
Saladi jihadi narrative. ISIS, on the one hand, uses Islamic eschatology and end times rhetoric,
with Palestine at the center, as its dominant recruitment tactic. On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s
ideology and strategy is centered around the liberation of Palestine. It is not simply the end times
narrative that drives Al Qaeda’s influence and global presence. Rather, Al Qaeda’s leadership
and spiritual father (Azzam) set the liberation of Palestine at the center of the organization’s
grand strategy. Under the leadership of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda adopted a propaganda strategy that
capitalizes on the liberation of Al Aqsa and the targeting of U.S. forces and interests as equitable
to attacks on Israel.
Section 5.2 Palestine as an annihilation movement
As seen in ISIS’ Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines, Palestine is a prominent theme that is
used almost exclusively in the context of Islamic end times rhetoric and, consequently, as a
motivational and organizational means to execute the unbeliever in an effort to retake Muslim
lands in preparation for the last days, according to Islamic end times eschatology.
Motivationally, ISIS uses Palestine as a religious justification for engaging in jihad.
Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS presents the Palestinian cause a a purely Islamic cause by equating the
liberation of Palestine with the annihilation of the kufar (Jews, Christians, Shiites, etc.). Hence,
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ISIS’ insistence on (a) joining the jihad to liberate Sunni Muslims from oppressive regimes and
(b) fighting as fard ‘ayn places Palestine at the forefront of ISIS’ grand strategy of annihilation.
Organizationally, ISIS has used Palestine as a means to liberate the nation from the inside
out- starting in Gaza. By establishing both Salafi jihadi cells and connections with pre-existing
groups in Gaza such as the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, ISIS has succeeded at consolidating a
presence in Palestine in preparation for its liberation as foretold by the end times narrative in
Islam.
Section 5.3 Palestine as a liberation movement
Al Qaeda, on the other hand, uses its magazine, Inspire, to encourage Muslims to join the
jihad against Israel and the West as part of its grand strategy to liberate Palestine from the Israeli
occupation and, consequently, Western influence.
Motivationally, Palestine is used by Al Qaeda in its propaganda in order to instill a sense
of moral obligation among its audience to join its ranks for the sake of liberating Palestine from
the Israeli occupation. Differing from the rhetoric of ISIS, Al Qaeda asserts itself as the
imminent defender of Palestine and this image is interwoven throughout each issue of Inspire, in
particular. In doing so, Al Qaeda positions itself as the sole body that will actually liberate
Palestine, thus using Palestine’s liberation as a means to encourage its audiences to join Al
Qaeda cells across the world.
Organizationally, the issue of Palestine has helped Al Qaeda establish an international
presence- most importantly in Palestine and the surrounding states. By positioning itself as the
defender of Palestine and establishing ideological and organizational ties with Salafi jihadi cells
both in Palestine and in the Levant, Al Qaeda has used the issue of Palestine to establish an
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international base and build up an international following that is centered around the liberation of
Palestine.
Section 5.4 Looking forward
The proliferation of the Israeli state undeniably led to the revival of transnational Salafi
jihad in the twentieth century and still contributes to its longevity. Today, Prime Minister
Netanyahu of Israel is both in the process of and planning to continue annexing sections of the
West Bank. Taking into account the growing influence of ISIS (and Al Qaeda, to an extent) in
Gaza, this constitutes a substantial security threat to Israel’s legitimacy. If Israel continues to
annex Palestinian land, the influence of ISIS in Gaza and amongst Salafi jihadi cells located
elsewhere in Palestine will only grow. Further, if U.S. policy continues to bolster Israel on every
side while refusing to condemn its human rights abuses, the Salafi jihadi threat in both Gaza and
the international arena will only increase. Therefore, if the rights and privileges of Palestinians
are not confronted at the international level, specifically by the U.S., transnational Salafi jihadi
organizations will only grow in power, influence, and recruitment success.
Section 5.5 In conclusion
Israel’s occupation of Palestine has undeniably conduced the revival of Salafi jihad in the
twentieth century and contributes to the longevity, transnationality, and ideology of the
movement today.
Taking into account the propaganda, grand strategies, histories, and leadership of Al
Qaeda and ISIS, there is no doubt that Palestine both drives and inspires the growth and
relevance of transnational Salafi jihadi organizations. While the situation in Israel-Palestine is an
objectively local issue, it has inspired the rise of transnational Salafi jihadi organizations
ideologically, historically, motivationally, and organizationally. The scopes of the most
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prominent Salafi jihadi organizations as discussed in this thesis attest to this fact: there would not
be any motivation to joining such an organization without the Palestinian issue. Organizationally,
these transnational organizations have always focused their end-goals on Palestine. By
establishing influence and ideological connections to small Salafi jihadi groups in Gaza, ISIS and
Al Qaeda have secured the foundation to potentially confront Israel militarily in the future.
Overall, neither Al Qaeda or ISIS would be half as relevant or successful without the
Israeli occupation of Palestine and the failures of neighboring Arab countries to put a stop to the
occupation. In taking advantage of regional wars and revolutions, capitalizing on liberating
Palestine as fard ‘ayn, moral obligation, and/or part of the Islamic end times narrative, Al Qaeda
and ISIS maintain their relevance, create jobs and purpose for many Palestinians and/or
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